



A Proposal to Study Negotiations and Compliance Control

Negotiation research and theory traditionally focus on negotiations as processes aimed at dispute settlement, dispute avoidance, or problem solving in general. The links between negotiations and compliance control have generated considerably less interest.

Compliance control means that states try to verify whether other states are complying with their international obligations, be they legally binding or only political. In the past, such control was exercised through diplomatic means. But as these processes have become more and more complex, requiring in-depth knowledge in specific fields, several international organizations

have been given responsibility for this activity. In the areas of human rights, disarmament, and environmental protection the call for efficient mechanisms and procedures has been especially loud.

But what links compliance control and negotiations? At least two links exist. The first relates to the measures that must be taken once it has been established that a state has failed to fully comply with its obligations. Because such control does not work like a court, measures either to sanction the wrongdoer or to help the country improve its performance must be negotiated within the main body of the responsible international organization. The second link reflects feedback. During the control process, certain compliance deficits may

be traced back to poor or loose drafting of the original text that generated the obligations in question. Thus, the best course may be to renegotiate the relevant provisions to improve implementation and compliance. This, again, requires skills in negotiating and drafting agreements, among others.

Future research into these links may benefit from traditional negotiation theory and practice; it may also broaden our understanding of negotiation processes. This, however, will depend on the availability of a sufficient number of case studies with a high degree of comparability. The author hopes that readers of this newsletter will carefully consider and respond to this proposal.

Winfried Lang

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From the PIN Steering Committee

This issue of *PIN Points* highlights three areas of emphasis in the program on the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Project based at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. It introduces a new series of articles on concepts of international negotiation, beginning with a discussion of ripeness. Conceptual development is important to the precision and intellectual grounding of a field of study and to the general organization of data into knowledge. *PIN Points* presents the concepts discussed here both for use and for testing.

This issue also comes at a time when the PIN committee is engaging in its new activity as a "road show" to encourage the study of negotiation. Members of the committee served as core participants at conferences in Buenos Aires, Kyoto, and Cambridge (USA), and the committee is now making a presentation at the Hassan II

University in Casablanca, Morocco. The committee plans other presentations for future meetings and is open to further invitations for "road shows."

Finally, the committee has begun two new projects in 1997. The PIN Project held a workshop in June on preventive diplomacy through negotiation, with unusually broad international participation (with participants from countries ranging from South Africa and Cameroon to South Korea, in addition to participants from Europe and North America). The committee is also developing a new project on nuclear negotiations, in preparation for a workshop in the summer of 1998 in Washington. In all three types of activity, the PIN committee is working to expand our knowledge of negotiation.

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Concepts in Negotiation: Ripeness

When, in the course of violent conflict, are parties ready to look for an accommodative solution with one another? And when can third parties fruitfully begin efforts to help the antagonists find such a solution? These questions, of central concern to conflict theorists and policymakers alike, can be answered by reference to the concept of ripeness.

The term *ripeness* comes from the lexicon of practitioners, who use it with significance and effect but only implicit content. "Ripeness of time is one of the absolute essences of diplomacy," writes John Campbell (1976, p. 73). "You have to do the right thing at the right time." However, few diplomats have clearly identified that essence, leaving it instead to intuition. Henry Kissinger (1974) did better, recognizing that "stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement." However, only recently has the concept of ripeness been taken up by analysts to make its content more explicit.

A conflict is defined as being ripe for meaningful negotiations (bilateral or mediated) when both parties perceive themselves to be in a painful deadlock or mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and see no options for escalating their way out of the stalemate at an acceptable cost. The MHS can be further locked into place in the parties' perceptions by a recent or narrowly missed disaster or by an impending catastrophe that serves as a deadline. Two additional elements required along with an MHS are a valid spokesperson for each side and a sense that a negotiated way out exists. A slightly different, more formulaic definition of ripeness is the condition where parties in conflict reassess the expected costs and benefits of their course and evaluate the cost of negotiation as being less than the cost of escalation or of simply holding out.

Ripeness is a hypothetically necessary but insufficient condition for settlement: it is not self-fulfilling or self-implementing and must be seized to be effective. Nor is it identical to its result, therefore it is not tautological. It has its own identifying components, which

researchers can seek (with some effort) in present or past cases, independent of the possible subsequent resolution. Not all ripe moments are grasped to open negotiations, but failure at negotiating an end to a conflict can often be ascribed to the absence of a ripe moment.

The basic reasoning underlying the MHS takes place through cost-benefit analysis, under the assumption that parties prepare to look for a more advantageous alternative when they find themselves on a pain-producing path. This calculation is fully consistent with public choice notions of rationality and public choice studies of negotiation, which assume that a party will pick the alternative it prefers, and that increasing pain associated with the present (conflictual) course will induce a decision to change. The ripe moment is necessarily a perceptual event, not one that stands alone in objective reality. It can be created if outside parties cultivate the perception of a painful present versus a preferable alternative, either by directly increasing the cost/pain or by heightening the antagonists' perceptions of pain through the judicious use of leverage (Touval, 1997). The party in question can resist the ripe moment so long as it refuses or is otherwise able to block out that perception. Thus, the concept of ripeness helps inform outside parties on how and when to mediate, but it should not be taken as an excuse for inaction. The analysis of ripeness also can be developed to indicate what to do in its absence: whether to produce or await it.

A number of studies beyond the original examination (Zartman, 1983; Touval and Zartman, 1985; Zartman, 1986; Zartman, 1989) have used and tested the notion of ripeness in theory and also in regard to negotiations in Zimbabwe, Namibia–Angola, Eritrea, South Africa, Philippines, Cyprus, Iran–Iraq, Israel, and Mozambique, among others (Haass, 1990; Stedman, 1991; Kriesberg and Thorson, 1991; Kleiboer, 1994; Pruitt and Olczak, 1995; Druckman and Green, 1995; Zartman, 1995; Hampson, 1996; Goodby, 1996; Matthews, 1997; Pruitt, 1997; Kleiboer, 1997).

The notion of a hurting stalemate has an important drawback: it is dependent on conflict. On the one hand, this

makes preventive diplomacy difficult, since the perception of an MHS is hard to produce early in a conflict. On the other hand, it means that ripeness requires raising the level of conflict until the stalemate is reached and then until it begins to hurt—and even then, working toward a perception of an impending catastrophe is required as well. The ripe moment becomes the godchild of brinkmanship.

Some of these concerns can be addressed directly. On the one hand, nothing in the notion of ripeness indicates that the stalemate must be at the highest level of conflict. All that is required is that both parties are hurt. On the other hand, the reality is that there must be conflict for conflict management, not only logically but also operationally.

Practitioners and students of conflict management would like to think that there could be a more positive prelude to negotiation. There are even some rare cases of negotiations, mediated or direct, that opened or came to closure without the push of an MHS, but instead through the pull of an attractive outcome. As in other ripe moments, these outcomes provided an opportunity for improvement, but not from a painful deadlock. Instead, the ripeness was produced by the enticement of something in that opportunity, an additional element that was more than simply an apparent way out. Rather, it was a new ingredient provided by a persistent mediator, an advantage that negotiations offered to improve relations with the third party (cf. Touval and Zartman, 1985; Saunders, 1991). Such an opening might be termed a mutually enticing opportunity—admittedly not as catchy a title, and a concept that needs more research (and practice).

I. William Zartman

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Negotiating the NATO–Russia Founding Act: A Case of Preventive Diplomacy

Among the various cases of preventive diplomacy where a possible crisis or conflict was avoided through negotiation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–Russia agreement of May 27, 1997, stands out as a pertinent and clear example. From this perspective, the agreement serves not only as a topic of analysis for policymakers, since the document is only the foundation for a further sequence of more specific and detailed talks, but should also be regarded as a good topic for academic research.

In the opening chapter of the forthcoming PIN volume on preventive diplomacy, I. William Zartman singles out three elements that distinguish preventive negotiation from other types of negotiation: changing *stakes*, changing *attitudes*, and appropriate *tactics*. In essence, this methodological scheme incorporates the elements necessary for studying a case of preventive negotiations and drawing lessons from this special type of dialogue.

In the case of the NATO–Russia talks, it is difficult to establish the beginning of the process: the concept of some type of agreement between the two parties was spelled out in the early 1990s, with no direct connection to the perspective of NATO enlargement. Only in 1994, when the Partnership for Peace was adopted as NATO's model of cooperation with former Communist countries of Eastern Central Europe, did the idea of a special arrangement between Russia and NATO acquire the form of a diplomatic proposal by the West. Russian reluctance regarding the Partnership impeded any negotiation on the subject of a NATO–Russia agreement, and during the next 16–18 months no further negotiations took place. But in early 1996, when NATO announced its decision to expand by incorporating Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance, Russian diplomacy immediately responded to the proposal of a special NATO–Russia agreement.

When the news came from Brussels that the decision on enlargement had already been planned for a summit in Madrid, both the stakes and Russia's attitude changed dramatically. First, there were

threats of retaliation: union with Belarus, rapprochement with China, a reversal of Russian defense policy, and an end to all efforts on arms control. Thereafter, Russia became the most active supporter of the idea of a treaty with NATO.

Unclear as it seemed at the time, the Russian attitude meant a possible return to confrontation. This was unacceptable to the West, not because the threat was especially credible, but because of growing domestic criticism of the decision on expansion. Clearly, both parties, after considering the possibility of a breakdown in their relations, decided to find ways to avoid a confrontation and to build up something like a compensating mechanism in the new form of an agreement. This idea prompted Secretary of State Warren Christopher's proposal for a NATO–Russia "charter" in his speech in Stuttgart in late 1996.

On the Russian side, President Boris Yeltsin could not accept the "charter" because of sharp criticism of his foreign policy by the conservative and nationalist opposition. By replacing the "pro-Western" Andrei Kozyrev with "moderate" Yevgeny Primakov as his foreign minister, the Russian president at least succeeded in changing the dominant attitudes in Russia toward the idea of an agreement with NATO. His political opponents heavily scrutinized the idea, but only a few of them suggested not signing anything at all. The majority agreed that some sort of agreement was greatly preferable to no agreement and unavoidable confrontation.

Thus, both sides adopted the tactics necessary to present the whole process as one that could bring a genuine solution. The negotiation process was artificially split into several sessions of meetings between Primakov and Javier Solana, NATO's secretary general, where the draft of an agreement was negotiated. The controversies centered on what the Russians called "security guarantees" against possible deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of the new NATO members, and against major changes in the conventional weapons ceilings negotiated in the 1990 Paris Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Russia also wanted a pledge that there would be no "second wave" of accessions or, if further accessions did occur,

that the decision would not be made without prior consultations with Russia.

The West, in return, could not make any binding pledge to satisfy the Russian demands but suggested going ahead with the CFE-2 Treaty and using the "German arrangement" principle (no deployment of NATO forces in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic after German unification). This tactic of combining step-by-step negotiations and references to extant mutual obligations from the previous period permitted both sides to draft an essentially acceptable text for the Founding Act—a term chosen instead of "charter" as a concession to Russian public opinion.

The entire process of this negotiation definitely calls for a substantial study, especially because only limited information appeared during the negotiations. But this means only that the whole subject of negotiations on preventive measures should be highlighted, since it may assume a much more universal nature in the transitional period after the end of the Cold War.

Victor A. Kremenyuk

PIN Holds Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy

PIN's project on preventive diplomacy through negotiation, organized by I. William Zartman and Victor Kremenyuk, examines preventive diplomacy from a new angle: by issue area. The project, which is supported by a grant from the Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, with an agreement to publish the study's findings in its series, covers 12 areas of activity in order to draw cooperative and cross-issue conclusions.

On June 8 and 9, 1997, the Swedish Institute for International Affairs in Stockholm, represented by PIN steering committee member Gunnar Sjöstedt, hosted a workshop on this subject. Eleven experts presented their contributions to the different areas, and discussants commented on them to stimulate further ideas within and between issue areas. Presentations were made by (or on behalf of) *Mark Anstey*, University of Port Elizabeth; *Anatole Ayissi*, International Relations Institute of Cameroon;

Sukyong Choi, Chungnam National University; *James Goodby*, Stanford University; *Fen Osler Hampson*, Carlton University; *Winfried Lang*, University of Vienna; *Kjell Åke Nordquist*, Uppsala University; *Timothy Sisk*, US Institute of Peace; *Gunnar Sjöstedt*, Swedish Institute for International Affairs; *Bertram I. Spector*, Center for Negotiation Analysis.

The discussants were *Rudolf Avenhaus*, Armed Forces University, Munich; *Didier Bigo*, Center for Studies in International Relations; *Guy Olivier Faure*, The Sorbonne; *P. Terrence Hopmann*, Brown University; *Timo Kivimäki*, University of Helsinki.

In his introductory talk, I. William Zartman set the stage for the workshop, and thus for the project as a whole. Starting from United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's definition of preventive diplomacy as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur," he turned to the ambiguities in the practice of preventing conflict. On the one hand, conflict is inevitable, often necessary, and sometimes beneficial. Also, ripeness theory indicates that conflicts are best managed when they are at the level of a mutually hurting stalemate. On the other hand, for good reasons, preventive diplomacy works to prevent escalation of a conflict to levels that threaten damage and call for further retaliation. Thus, the question "Prevent what?" shades into the question "Prevent when?"

In the intended study, the "action" in Boutros-Ghali's definition is limited to negotiation, direct or mediated. Moving the contestants from violence or escalation involves three elements, namely, *stakes*, *attitudes*, and *tactics*. *Stakes* are the apparently objective element in conflict control and must be formulated so that they no longer imply an "I win, you lose" type of conflict; thus, each party can gain something from an agreement. *Attitudes* are the subjective element, coloring the black-and-white portrayals of stakes. Preventive diplomacy involves altering each party's attitudes from conflictual to accommodative, which is as important as affecting stakes. *Tactics*, the third element of preventive diplo-

macy, may be defined as doing the right thing at the right time. In this context, it means presenting arguments for reconsidering stakes and for changing attitudes at a time and in a manner that is most effective in capturing attention and altering behavior.

The papers contributed to and presented at the workshop were organized into 12 *issue areas*: boundary problems, territorial claims, unification of divided states, state disintegration, peacemaking processes, cooperation disputes, trade wars, transboundary disputes, global natural disasters, global security disasters, global security interbloc relations, and labor disputes. Following the discussants' presentations and subsequent exchanges, the participants were able to recognize fundamental characteristics of preventive diplomacy. First, preventive diplomacy requires proactive initiatives: in this case, sustained efforts to diagnose an issue area to identify problems before they become conflicts, rather than putting out fires. Second, it generally requires either the creation or the maintenance of regimes—routine or institutionalized ways of dealing with a particular type of problem. Third, the key to initiation and success of preventive negotiations is the shared perception that the averted costs of further conflicts will outweigh the cost of early action.

The project organizers will review the revised manuscripts in early 1998, in preparation for publication by the end of the year. So far, they plan to include the following contributions in a book on preventive diplomacy: *Setting the Stage*, I. William Zartman; *Boundary Disputes*, Kjell Åke Nordquist; *Territorial Conflicts*, Anatole Ayissi; *Divided States*, Sukyong Choi; *Disintegrating States*, P. Terrence Hopmann; *Peace Processes in Ethnic Conflicts*, Timothy Sisk; *Cooperative Disputes*, Fen Osler Hampson; *Trade Wars*, Gunnar Sjöstedt; *Transboundary Environmental Disputes*, Bertram Spector; *Global Natural Disasters*, Winfried Lang; *Global Security Conflicts—Armaments*, James Goodby; *Global Security Conflicts—Alliances*, Victor Kremenyuk; *Labor Disputes*, Mark Anstey; *Lessons for Practice*, Winfried Lang; *Lessons for Theory*, I. William Zartman.

Rudolf Avenhaus

Can the US Emissions Trading Proposal Succeed in Kyoto?

Governments will meet in Kyoto in December to translate the nonbinding agreements made at the Rio conference into action. A possible policy design would establish carbon emission quotas that would keep countries within agreed, unchangeable emission limits. However, such a policy would not be cost-effective—a quality that, of course, is crucial to the policy design, given that the goal is to limit the global use of fossil fuels, a major determinant of economic development.

Cost-effectiveness requires that the national carbon emission quotas be internationally tradable. The US government has recently proposed the use of tradable emission quotas for consideration in Kyoto, but to date most other countries have hesitated to endorse this approach.

A recent policy experiment evaluated the chances that an efficient climate change policy might gain international acceptance. Peter Bohm, Professor of Economics at Stockholm University, carried out an unusual test of the likely extent of international agreement or disagreement when a situation finally becomes urgent. Will countries opt for cost-effectiveness in terms of a tradable quota treaty or will they prefer a more expensive alternative?

In the test, experienced diplomats—24 of whom were ambassadors and each of whom was familiar with one of 29 countries—acted as country representatives confronted with a hypothetical take-it-or-leave-it tradable quota proposal. According to this proposal, the rich (OECD) countries would share all costs, whereas poorer countries would obtain emission quotas large enough to keep them unharmed economically. The test results indicate that a majority of both the rich and the non-rich countries could accept such a proposal, given comprehensive information about the properties of this potentially fair treaty. These majorities included all of the richest countries except Japan,

but none of the major non-rich countries—China, India, and Russia.

The study report explains how the diplomats were recruited for this type of inquiry and discusses the extent to which the participants were probably guided by relevant incentives when responding. The report can be ordered from the Nordic Council of Ministers, Store Strandstrasse 18, Copenhagen, Denmark; fax: +45 339 60200.

Gunnar Sjöstedt

Israel Hosts International Workshop on Negotiations over Water

Under the aegis of the UNESCO International Hydrological Program, the Israel Center for Negotiation and Conflict Management (ICN), Haifa, hosted a workshop on negotiations over water from May 25–27, 1997. The workshop brought together water resources experts and negotiation researchers to develop approaches relevant to water management under conditions of conflict. The crucial need is to resolve disputes among users vying for the same scarce resource: in this case, an element essential to sustaining human life and any form of civilization. The issue involves many types of stakeholders, and their different needs, cultural backgrounds, and value systems could lead to a vast number of potential conflicts.

The conference was locally organized by Yona Shamir, executive director of ICN, and chaired by Uri Shamir, Water Research Institute, Technion University. Among the water experts were

F. Hartvelt, United Nations Development Programme

F. Fisher, Harvard University, Middle East Water Project;

Le Huu Ti, The Mekong River Commission

P. Nachtnebel, University of Vienna

K. Hipel, University of Waterloo

U. Shamir, Technion University.

The negotiation researchers included

H. Raiffa, Harvard University

M. Bazerman, Northwestern University

G.O. Faure, The Sorbonne and PIN

J. Delli Priscoli, US Army

J. Montville, Washington

M. Trolldalen, University of Oslo

J. Dellapenna, Villanova University

A broad and diverse Israeli group attended the workshop, as did several experts from the Palestinian Authority. Among the topics dealt with were concrete subjects such as how to allocate water from the Jordan River. The researchers presented experiences and lessons drawn from other cases, such as those concerning the Rhine and the Mekong Rivers, and the interested parties thoroughly examined some models that might help in designing a solution. Other participants focused on various sensitive dimensions of managing conflicts over water, such as cultural issues, psychological difficulties, and obstacles to creating mutual gains.

Thanks to the efforts of the organizers and the active involvement of several of the participants, the workshop was able to demonstrate that possibilities remain for discussion among parties to the dispute over water from the Jordan River and that negotiation is not totally deadlocked. Participants also learned another useful lesson from the conference: it is far more acceptable, and probably more effective, to design new methods to handle difficult problems and thorny issues than to present ready-made solutions to the parties. Given the magnitude of the challenge, another such workshop is absolutely necessary and would contribute considerably to the development of a "negotiation culture," such as the one that has evolved over the years regarding Rhine River pollution or the process now under way with the Mekong project.

The proceedings of the conference will be published in an edited book that could serve as a reference for water resource managers, negotiators, and researchers confronted with highly conflictual settings.

Guy Olivier Faure

Complexity, Actor Roles, and Leadership in Multilateral Negotiation

In recent years, an increasing number of researchers have become interested in the analysis of multilateral negotiation. One explanation is the continued internationalization of significant policy areas and a related concern for global governance. Multilateral talks also attract the attention of researchers because they constitute a relatively neglected area of negotiation analysis. Studies on multilateral talks have generally either had an institutional perspective or have focused on substance, such as trade, environmental hazards, or human rights.

Certified, generalized knowledge about the processes and mechanics of multilateral talks remains relatively scarce. Theory-oriented students of negotiation have for the most part faced bilateral situations. This focus on two-party encounters has in many ways been a fruitful strategy that has contributed to the development of negotiation analysis into one of the most sophisticated subfields in the study of international relations. Consistent concentration on the relatively simple two-party situation has paved the way for the accumulation of knowledge and the application of highly structured theoretical approaches for both understanding and policy prescription. It is suggestive that several attempts to move the front line of negotiation analysis into the multilateral context have relied on a research strategy to extend a bilateral model into a more complex—multiparty—situation without altering its fundamental premises.

This research approach has, however, been only moderately successful. For example, game theorists may be perfectly correct in asserting that their theoretical approach can also be applied to a multilateral situation, because the most important choices are often made by only a few leading actors (Brams, Doherty, and Weidner, 1994). However, this analysis has only limited value, as it depends on the proposition that at certain critical junctures in the process multilateral talks in reality take on the character of bilateral bargaining. Although this

approach may be quite interesting and constructive for some research objectives, its principal weakness is that it systematically neglects the various special features of multilateral talks that are not covered by the bilateral model.

Recently, Per Larsson has offered a contribution to the academic discussions about multilateral negotiation in his doctoral thesis on regime-building negotiations in Europe concerning the hazardous problem of acid rain (Larsson, 1996). The project was designed as a case study for making analytical generalizations concerning the nature of multilateral talks in a regime-building context. Larsson draws from Alexander George to defend the case study approach: "... [it] is regarded as an opportunity to learn more about the complexity of the problem studied. . . and to refine and elaborate the initially available theory. . . ." (George, 1979). Larsson investigates the negotiation on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). These talks started at the 1975 Conference on European Security in Helsinki and ended in November 1979 with the signing of a convention text. Larsson's objective is to describe how participants of regime negotiations on transboundary air pollution reached an agreement on the contractual conditions of the regime.

Larsson approaches the analysis of the negotiations on acid rain in Europe inspired by cybernetic decision theory (Steinbruner, 1974). The analytical framework leans on the ideas of a few scholars who have focused in particular on the management of knowledge /information, uncertainty, and complexity in multilateral talks (Touval, 1989; Winham, 1986; and Zartman, 1994). The study is organized in three main sections. The first three chapters lay out objectives, take methodological positions, and establish the analytical framework. The case story describes the development of the actual negotiations. In the subsequent analytical section, Larsson attempts to find a general characterization of regime-building negotiations by looking at categories of actors, issues, negotiation arenas (formal, informal endogenous, informal exogenous, and peripheral arenas), and levels, making a distinction between technical and political levels. The analysis also identi-

fies and assesses linkages between these various phenomena.

The most important part of the analytical section is Larsson's process analysis, although he himself does not employ that designation. The most important—and novel—element of the process analysis pertains to the patterns of interaction between significant actors. To begin to map these patterns, Larsson applies a sort of role analysis. He distinguishes four major roles performed by the parties to the acid rain negotiation: leader, blocker, follower, and mediator. Of these, the leadership role should be highlighted. The formula Larsson uses for a comprehensive description of the whole process is a leadership-driven trial-and-error search process.

An important part of Larsson's role analysis is the determination of critical requirements for leadership in the acid rain negotiations. This discussion becomes concrete because Larsson is particularly concerned with how the Nordic countries performed in the negotiation. A general observation is that in this first round of negotiation Norway and Sweden were especially active in moving the negotiation toward an agreement, and that they succeeded fairly well in this enterprise. This is surprising because the two small Scandinavian countries were facing a formidable ad hoc coalition that included the largest members of the then European Community: the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy. At that time these countries opposed effective measures to cope with the long-range air pollution that leads to acidification because they considered such an intervention too costly. In other words, Sweden and particularly Norway were capable of providing leadership to the negotiations even though they were only two small states confronting a larger group of middle powers. The explanation is that both Oslo and Stockholm were able to undertake leadership tasks that are normally reserved for great powers. The Scandinavians were very active and influential in setting the agenda for the upcoming talks on acid rain and in building up a coalition supporting the agenda. Prerequisites for this performance were access to superior knowledge about the problem of acid rain, the competence to

use this information in the process, and diplomatic skill to take advantage of institutions and procedures of the UN system.

Accordingly, one important lesson from Larsson's study is that leadership in multilateral talks should not be regarded as a general characteristic of particular types of international actors, such as great powers, for example. Instead, leadership should be conceived of as a combination of several specific capabilities, each of which a given actor may possess to a greater or lesser degree. The case of the acid rain negotiations of the 1970s demonstrates that, to a surprising extent, even small states may possess the capabilities that lead to effective leadership in multilateral talks. However, the same case also indicates that background factors condition the usability of some leadership capabilities. Thus, in the acid rain case the leadership role of the Scandinavian countries was facilitated by the linkages to the super-power game between the Soviet Union and the USA concerning security in Europe. The USA seemingly did not favor any particular position in the negotiations. However, Washington did not want to have a failure in the talks on acid rain because such an outcome might have obstructed the negotiations in the ESC context.

Larsson's study indicates the linkage between external factors pertaining to the environment of a negotiation and actor behavior in the process, but does not address it in-depth. Accordingly, these issues remain significant items on the research agenda.

Gunnar Sjöstedt

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International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice

International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice will complete its second year of publication in 1997. Each issue examines a particular theme concerning the process of international negotiation from an interdisciplinary, conceptual, and empirical perspective, using a blend of theoretical articles, case studies, historical assessments, and rigorous research studies. The following issues are examined in Volumes 1 (1996) and 2 (1997): *Negotiation Metaphors: Framing International Negotiations Anew*, 1(1); *Defining a US Negotiating Style*, 1(2); *Negotiations in the Former Soviet Union and the Former Yugoslavia*, 1(3); *Ethnic Bargaining: Conflict Management in Pluralistic Societies*, 2(1); *Lessons Learned from the Middle East Peace Process*, 2(2); *Conflict Resolution Training in Divided Societies*, 2(3).

Future issues will focus on the following themes: *The Teaching of International Negotiation*; *The Post-Agreement Negotiation Process*; *Social Exchange Theory and International Negotiation*; *Culture and Negotiation*; *Negotiations in the European Union*; *Rio + 5: Evaluating Negotiating Processes of Policies for Sustainable Development*; and *Negotiations on Non-Traditional Security Issues*.

If you would like to contribute to these issues, propose a theme, or be a guest editor for an upcoming issue, please contact Dr. Bertram I. Spector,

Editor, Center for Negotiation Analysis, 11608 Le Havre Drive, Potomac, MD 20854, USA; phone/fax: +301 309 1962 (E-mail: negoctr@msn.com). In addition, the journal always considers paper submissions that do not fit into the selected themes for publication in periodic issues devoted to new research in the field of international negotiation. All submissions are peer reviewed.

To access tables of contents and abstracts from past issues, visit the journal's World Wide Web page at <http://www.business.carleton.ca/interneg/reference/journals/in/>. Requests for subscriptions or particular issues should be sent to the publisher: Kluwer Law International, P.O. Box 85889, 2508 CN The Hague, Netherlands (E-mail: sales@kli.wkap.nl) or Kluwer Law International, 675 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA (E-mail: sales@kli.com).

I. William Zartman

Dean Pruitt to Receive IACM Award

Dean Pruitt will receive the Lifetime Achievement Award at the 1997 International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) Conference in Bonn, Germany. He will join the ranks of other luminaries such as Anatol Rappoport, Morton Deutsch, and Robert Blake, all past recipients of this award.

Dr. Pruitt is a Distinguished Professor in the Department of Psychology at the State University of New York at Buffalo. His major research and writing have been in the areas of conflict processes, negotiation, and mediation. He has published over 100 journal articles and book chapters, and he is author or co-author of *Negotiation Behavior* (1981), *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement* (1994), *Negotiation in Social Conflict* (1993), and *Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention* (forthcoming).

Dr. Pruitt has been associated with the PIN Project for many years; he has contributed to books edited by PIN and has actively contributed to conferences and workshops. PIN congratulates Dr. Pruitt on this award.

1998 Annual Meeting of the International Association for Conflict Management

The 11th annual meeting of the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) will be held June 7–10, 1998, at the Inn and Conference Center on the campus of the University of Maryland in College Park. Chester Crocker will present the keynote address. This conference will provide a forum for scholars and practitioners from all disciplines interested in the study of social conflict and conflict resolution at every level of society. Among the topics to be discussed are negotiation and third-party intervention in interpersonal, intergroup, organizational, and international conflict. The deadline for submissions is February 15, 1998. For further information, contact the president of IACM, Professor Peter Carnevale, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 603 E. Daniel St., Champaign, IL 61820, USA; or contact him by E-mail (p-carnevale@uiuc.edu).

I. William Zartman

New PIN Book

International Economic Negotiations: Models versus Reality

A book edited by Victor Kremenyuk and Gunnar Sjöstedt is currently being prepared by the Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) Project at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). The table of contents follows.

Part I: Introduction

1) *International Economic Negotiations: Research, Talks, and Approaches* - Victor A. Kremenyuk, Gunnar Sjöstedt, and I. William Zartman

Part II: Case Studies

Section I. Direct investment

- 2) *Negotiation between the French Government and the Walt Disney Company Regarding the Creation of EuroDisney* - Geoffrey Fink (USA)
- 3) *Negotiation on Joint Ventures in China* - Guy Olivier Faure (France)
- 4) *Renegotiation of the Valco Agreement in Ghana: Contribution to a Theoretical Interpretation* - Akilagpa Sawyerr (Ghana)

Section II. Macroeconomic issues

- 5) *Understanding Nigeria's Economic Reform: An Application of Negotiation Theory* - Bright Erakpoweri Okogu (Nigeria)

Section III. Financial and monetary issues

- 6) *Negotiation on Reorganization of Commercial Debt: Poland and the London Club, 1981–1994* - Czeslaw Mesjasz (Poland)
- 7) *Monetary Negotiations on the Serpent in Europe* - I. William Zartman and Lynn Wagner (USA)

Section IV. Trade issues

- 8) *The Uruguay Round Negotiation on Service: Economic Basis—Political Outcome* - Anders Ahnliid (Sweden)
- 9) *Economic Negotiations in the CIS: A Way to Alliance* - Maria Vlasova (Russia)
- 10) *Silicon for the Masses: How AT&T Has Licensed its Intellectual Property To Enable the Development of the Worldwide Semiconductor Industry* - Robert E. Kerwin and Richard A. DeFelice (USA)
- 11) *The NAFTA Agreement: Economic and Negotiation Perspectives* - Gilbert R. Winham and Annie Finn (Canada)
- 12) *Market Conditions and International Economic Negotiation: Japan and the United States in 1991* - John S. Odell (USA)

Part III: Analysis

- 13) *Economic Perspective in International Economic Negotiations* - Robert Neugeboren (USA)
- 14) *Negotiation Analysis Perspective in International Economic Negotiation* - I. William Zartman (USA)
- 15) *How Does Economic Theory Interrelate with Negotiation Analysis* - Gunnar Sjöstedt (Sweden)

Conclusion

This issue of *PIN Points* is also available on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.iiasa.ac.at/PINPoints>

If you know anyone who might be interested in receiving *PIN Points*, or if you wish to access *PIN Points* via the World Wide Web instead of receiving a printed version, please contact Ulrike Neudeck by phone (+43 2236 807 267), fax (+43 2236 71313), or E-mail (neudeck@iiasa.ac.at).

PIN  Points

The Processes of International Negotiation Project

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Recent Publications

Process of International Negotiations, F. Mautner Markof, editor, 1989, Westview Press, Inc., 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, CO 80301, USA. ISBN 0-8133-7721-8.

International Negotiations: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, V.A. Kremenyuk, editor, 1991, Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 350 Sansome Street, San Francisco, CA 94104, USA. ISBN 1-55542-297-7.

International Environmental Negotiations, G. Sjöstedt, editor, 1992, Sage Publications, Inc., 2445 Teller Road, Newbury Park, CA 91320, USA. ISBN 0-8039-4760-7.

Culture and Negotiations. The Resolution of Water Disputes, G.O. Faure, J.Z. Rubin, editors, 1993, Sage Publications, Inc., 2445 Teller Road, Newbury Park, CA 91320, USA. ISBN 0-8039-5370-4(cloth); 0-8039-5371-2 (paper).

International Multilateral Negotiations: Approaches to the Management of Complexity, I.W. Zartman, editor, 1994, Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 350 Sansome Street, San Francisco, CA 94104, USA. ISBN 1-55542-642-0.

Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), B.I. Spector, G. Sjöstedt, I.W. Zartman, editors, 1994, Graham & Trotman Limited, Sterling House, 66 Wilton Road, London, SW1V 1DB, UK. ISBN 1-85966-077-0.